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Michelle Alfonso 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
Marissa Mayer, President and CEO of Yahoo Inc.,
1
 became a proud parent of a baby boy 
in late September of 2012.
2
  Mayer took control of the board at Yahoo during her third trimester 
with every step of her pregnancy scrutinized by the media.
3
  This news, if heard merely 30 years 
ago would have probably shocked women around America.  Yet, in modern society this news 
symbolizes a major success for women from a long uphill struggle.  Mayer has accomplished 
what some women wouldn’t dare to dream even with the contemporary notions of equal 
opportunity for men and women.  Mayer’s extraordinary story begs the question whether more 
stories like hers will come into fruition and whether the glass ceiling has been shattered once and 
for all? 
Unfortunately, this paper answers this question in the negative.  Women are still 
underrepresented when it comes to the highest earning positions in Fortune 500 companies.
4
  
The statistical evidence in this paper focuses on the Fortune 500 and large companies because 
these entities serve as a guidepost for American corporate culture that are most likely best 
equipped with resources to provide opportunities to women.
5
  Arguably, if gender discrimination 
exists in the Fortune 500 and large companies, which generally provide programs to incentivize 
                                                        
1
 Yahoo, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 9, 2012). 
2
 Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Chief Marissa Mayer Welcomes New Baby Boy, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 1, 2012), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/yahoo-ceo-marissa-mayer-welcomes-new-baby-boy/ 
3
 Id. 
4
 Catalyst, 2010 Targeting Inequity: The Gender Gap in U.S. Corporate Leadership, 2, (2012) available 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=90f0aade-d9f5-43e7-8501-46bbd1c69bb8. 
5
 See id. at 2. 
 2 
and promote advancement of women, then it is likely that gender discrimination may be 
prevalent in smaller business that may not have the resources to provide these incentives. 
Although we have made great strides with gender equality since the inception of 1964 
Civil Rights Act,
6
 the current interpretation of Title VII
7
 still gives insufficient protection for 
women in the workplace attempting entry into upper level management.
8
  While many scholars 
explain the glass ceiling by attributing the lack of women in leadership to personal preferences,
9
 
or the maternal wall,
10
 this paper proposes that other reasons, such as implicit discrimination,
11
 
may also be keeping certain women from reaching higher positions in corporate America.  
Implicit bias
12
 is prevalent in workplaces,
13
 as stereotypes have long captured women into certain 
traditional gender roles and these perceptions may also be hindering their path up the corporate 
ladder.
14
 
Title VII could provide some remedy to the implicit bias problem by raising the 
employer’s evidentiary burden in Title VII disparate treatment cases.15  In the proposed solution, 
an employer would have to show by clear and convincing evidence, instead of by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that an employment decision was not made due to 
                                                        
6
 Title VII is legislation that prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion or 
national origin. Title VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1993). 
7
 Id. 
8
 See infra Part III. 
9
 See infra Part II.A. 
10
 See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-
Family Conflict, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14 (2010). 
11
 See infra Part II.B.1 
12
 See infra Part II.B.1 
13
 See Evelyn F. Murphy WITH E.J. Graff, Getting Even, 175 (2005). 
14
 See infra Part II.B. 
15
 In disparate treatment cases, Plaintiffs can prove discrimination under Title VII by showing an employment 
decision was “tied to a discriminatory animus that an illegitimate factor had a “motivating” or “substantial” role in 
the employment decision.”  Employers can subsequently defend this claim by providing a legitimate business 
reason, by a showing of a preponderance of the evidence. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 
522 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 3 
discrimination. Therefore, potentially alleviating the plaintiff from arguing the defendant’s 
reason was a pretext if the employer fails to meet the higher burden.
16
  Another possible solution 
presented in this paper is to interpret Title VII to cover implicit bias or workplace bias.   This 
proposed cause of action would involve a plaintiff putting forth a case that an employer was 
aware of and maintained a gender biased work environment.  Unlike a hostile work environment 
claim,
17
 which requires overt actions by employers or management, this claim would attempt to 
capture the more subtle aspects of workplace discrimination.  In order to claim this under Title 
VII, an employer’s work environment would have to impact the plaintiff’s ability to obtain a 
promotion or advancement, while a plaintiff would be qualified for advancement and meets 
expected performance metrics.  For example, an employer could be held liable for promoting 
male oriented corporate activities, such as golf, football games, etc or for failure to provide 
women with adequate female mentors.  Similar to the hostile work environment theory, the 
proposed “biased work environment” interpretation would make employers liable for creating 
and maintaining a biased work environment or furthering implicit or structural discrimination.   
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I introduces and discusses the problem—why more 
women are not seated at the helm of Fortune 500 companies, if recent statistics show it may be 
better for business.
18
  Part II will explore why corporate America, which by its nature is the most 
prepared of all employers in the nation to address this issue, yet cannot seem to fix the problem.  
Part III will discuss the defects in Title VII when it comes to protecting women climbing the 
                                                        
16
 Under Ezold, if the employer’s defense is sufficient, the Plaintiff would otherwise have to argue that the 
employers justification was a pretext and not really the basis of its policy.  Id. at 523 
17
 A hostile work environment is found when a workplace is both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a 
reasonable person would find abusive. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 141 L. 
Ed. 2d 662 (1998). 
18
 See Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, CREDIT SUISSE, (2012), 
https://infocus.creditsuisse.com/data/_product_documents/_shop/360145/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_perf
ormance.pdf; see also Catalyst, supra note 4. 
 4 
corporate ladder.  Part IV will discuss two proposed solutions.  One proposed solution would be 
to raise the evidentiary burden of Title VII disparate treatment cases, and another would be to 
interpret Title VII to create stronger workplace bias protections.  The paper will conclude with a 
discussion of each solution and provide a recommendation that would attempt to solve the 
problem. 
I. Corporate America’s Efforts to Increase Women Leaders 
The corporate world is making vast efforts to include women and expand the gender 
diversity of their workers.
19
  A quick website search of some of the companies on the Fortune 
500 reveals many incentives for women, such as programs for advancement of women, 
providing flexible work hours, or touting of stories of women workers and women leaders.
20
  
Examples of women’s advancement initiatives include programs such as GM’s Women’s Retail 
Network, which strives to increase the female presence in the automotive industry.
21
  Dow 
Chemical’s WIN program, offers women mentoring and networking opportunities.22  To assist 
family needs, companies provide flexible schedules such as Bank of America’s compressed 
work-weeks, telecommuting and “Flextime.”23  Some, more extreme examples of these types of 
initiatives include Sun Microsystems, Inc., which allows almost half of the employees at Sun 
                                                        
19
 Female Power, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/15174418 
20
 See Id. See also, e.g. GENERAL MOTORS CO., http://www.gmdealerdevelopment.com/wri/index.html (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012); DOW CHEMICAl COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/careers/diversity/environment/woman.htm (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012); BANK OF AMERICA CORP., http://careers.bankofamerica.com/learnmore/flexible_wa.asp (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
21
 GENERAL MOTORS CO, http://www.gmdealerdevelopment.com/wri/index.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012). 
22
 DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, http://www.dow.com/careers/diversity/environment/woman.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 
2012). 
23
 BANK OF AMERICA CORP, http://careers.bankofamerica.com/learnmore/flexible_wa.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 
2012). 
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Microsystems to work from home and Raytheon, allows workers every other Friday off to take 
care of family business.
24
  
A.  American Women Struggle Up the Corporate Ladder 
 
Despite these growing corporate women’s initiatives, a report provided by Catalyst Inc., a 
nonprofit think-tank organized to promote advancement of women in business, samples the years 
1996 to 2009 and depicts the slow rate of progress for women in the Fortune 500.
25
 “While 
women constitute nearly half of the total work force
26
 and earn 57 percent of Bachelor’s degrees, 
60 percent of Masters degrees,
27
 and control or influence 73 percent of the consumer 
decisions
28
....women make up less than three percent of CEOs and hold roughly 15 percent of 
board seats.”29  Although the number of women CEO’s are technically at a record high, given the 
weaker historical significance of women leadership in corporate governance, this is not a 
miraculous accomplishment.  The report further documents that the number of women are still 
underrepresented in leadership at the Fortune 500 and these leadership positions decrease the 
further up the corporate ladder women ascend.
30
  
Not only are women underrepresented in corporate governance, but there is also evidence 
that women are still are paid less than men.  Historical evidence suggests a long-term 
discrimination between the salaries of comparable men and women.
31
 The earnings gap for 
women in 2012 is 77 cents on the dollar compared to men according to the most recent U.S. 
                                                        
24
  Economist, supra note 19. 
25
 Catalyst, supra note 4. 
26
 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, ANNUAL AVERAGES TABLES FROM THE 2009 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 
(2010). 
27
 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS (2009). 
28
 MICHAEL J. SILVERSTEIN ET AL., WOMEN WANT MORE: HOW TO CAPTURE YOUR SHARE OF THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST, FASTEST-GROWING MARKET (2009). 
29
  Catalyst, supra note 4, at 2 
30
 Id. 
31
 FRANCINE D. BLAU, MARY C. BRINTON & DAVID B. GRUSKY, DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF GENDER, 113 (2006). 
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census.
32
  With respect to corporate America, the Catalyst report suggests that women in Fortune 
500 companies still earned less than men, as women tend to start behind and therefore stay 
behind, equally qualified men.
33
  The Catalyst report found that women averaged $4,600 less in 
their initial jobs, which because of percentage based raises, result in men’s salary growth 
outpacing women’s salary growth.34  Also, when women return to the corporate track after 
leaving for motherhood or other reasons, they pay more penalty in position and compensation 
compared to men.
35
  
This is not solely an insular concern in corporate America, these statistics are becoming a 
broader socioeconomic concern via macroeconomic deskilling.
36
  Macroeconomic deskilling is 
an idea suggesting that the U.S. stands to lose global competitiveness if it continues to expend 
resources in educating women, but not utilizing them to their full capacity.
37
  Women are driven 
out of the workforce or into less skilled or advanced jobs due to inflexible workplaces and family 
responsibility discrimination.
38
  The continued deskilling has large impacts on the economy and 
could present long-term problems for the U.S. economy competing in a global marketplace.
39
 
 B.  The Case for Gender Diversity in Corporate Governance 
Corporate America may have very compelling reasons to include more women in 
leadership positions.  First, there is evidence to suggest that having women in leadership 
                                                        
32
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf. 
33
 Catalyst, supra note 4, at 10. 
34
 Id. 
35
 Id. (“Although women and men step off the corporate track at equal rates, women paid a greater 
penalty than men in position and compensation when they return.” ). 
36
 Joan C. Williams, Jessica Manvell,  & Stephanie Bornstien, Opt-Out or Pushed-Out? How the Press Covers 
Work/Family Conflict: The Untold Story of Why Women Leave the Workforce, HASTINGS: THE CTR FOR WORK-LIFE 
LAW, 43 (2006), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf  
37 Id. see also Women and the World Economy: A guide to Womenomics, ECONOMIST (April 12, 2006). 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory. cfm?story_id=6802551 
38
 Id.  
39
 Id. 
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positions may help company performance.
40
  Recent studies provide that companies with more 
women in senior roles are positively correlated to better performance and potentially higher 
profits.
41
  Although none of these studies have demonstrated a causal link, companies may 
benefit from a more diverse workforce given current metrics.
42
  The Catalyst report concluded 
that “companies with more women board members, on average, significantly outperform those 
with fewer women, by 53 percent on Return on Equity, 42 percent on Return on Sales and...66 
percent of Return on Invested Capital.”43  A report by Credit Suisse sampled companies in 
Europe and the U.S. and discovered that companies with women board members outperformed 
those who did not have any women on their board’s in terms of price share performance over the 
past six years.
44
  The Credit Suisse report also reached similar conclusions, as the Catalyst report 
stating that on average, return on equity was much higher for companies that had women leaders 
than those who did not.
45
  In addition, the Credit Suisse report found that companies with women 
on the board also had increased growth rates at 14%, compared to 10% for companies with only 
males on the board.
46
 A Mckinsey & Co. study found using the McKinsey Organizational Health 
Index (“OHI”),47 that companies with three or more women in top positions scored higher than 
                                                        
40
 Bryce Covert, Memo to Corporate America: More Women Leaders Means Better Bottom Line, FORBES WOMAN, 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/brycecovert/2012/08/01/memo-to-corporate-america-more-women-
leaders-means-a-better-bottom-line/ 
41
 Closing the Gap, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26, 2011), www.economist.com/node/21539932 
42
 Id. 
43
 Catalyst, supra note 4, at 12. 
44
 See e.g. Covert, supra note 40; see also Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, CREDIT SUISSE (Aug. 
2012), 
https://infocus.creditsuisse.com/data/_product_documents/_shop/360145/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_perf
ormance.pdf 
45
 See Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, supra note 44 at 18 
46
 Id. at 14. 
47
 The OHI measures nine factors, ranging from external orientation to coordination and control, that are linked to 
well-functioning organizations. See Joanna Barsh & Lareina Yee, MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING THE FULL 
POTENTIAL OF WOMEN IN THE US ECONOMY, (2011) available at 
www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/unlocking_the_full_potential.  
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their peers, and  companies which score higher on the OHI demonstrate superior financial 
performance.
48
  
  Additionally, corporate America certainly has other strong incentives to advance women 
through its ranks to maintain efficiency, increase diversity and improve performance.  Corporate 
America loses many of its qualified women when they do not reach upper level management.  It 
is very expensive for companies to spend resources training and developing women without 
being able to capitalize this investment, as women do not advance through the ranks or leave the 
workforce.
49
 Arguably, companies should want to retain these women to obtain the benefits of a 
broader talent pool, and also reduce costs by improving retention rates.  Additionally, gender 
diversity may help promote different perspectives, as this may be helpful in innovation or 
development of new methods or ideas.  Studies show that greater team diversity including gender 
diversity can lead to better average performance.
50
  Also, research suggests that introducing 
women in leadership allows for a better balance of leadership skills, as women possess certain 
leadership qualities that are beneficial which men generally do not exhibit.  Combining both men 
and women leaders together would have a beneficial effect of balancing these skills.
51
 For 
example, a study found that women tend to define and communicate responsibilities more clearly 
and serve as stronger mentors and coaches to employees.
52
  Women’s leadership styles focus on 
the needs of others, whereas men’s styles are geared towards competition.53  The combination of 
these respective gender traits would allow for a better balance of essential leadership qualities 
among a group of managers. 
                                                        
48
 Id. 
49
 Women and Work, Too Many Suits, ECONOMIST (Nov. 26 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/21539924 
50
 Gender Diversity & Corporate Performance, supra note 44, at 18 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
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Part II.  Corporate America and Discrimination Against Women 
 This section discusses the possible explanations for the glass ceiling, other than 
discrimination.  Throughout the years, many scholars have argued against the idea of the glass 
ceiling and posit that the problem is not a product of the workplace, rather many argue that 
women seek not to advance to leadership positions, as women believe family life is more 
important or rewarding than having a career or that pregnancy and motherhood deters women 
from being able to focus on their careers.  Although these are valid arguments, these may not be 
the only explanations for the lack of women leaders.  The section will subsequently discuss the 
possibility of unconscious bias and its role of keeping women from advancing in the workplace. 
 A.  Preference of American Women 
 Given the publicized statistical evidence showing diversity is good for the bottom line,
54
 
wouldn’t corporations make greater efforts to include women in leadership roles?  What could 
explain the disparity of women in leadership positions?
55
  Could this be related to residual 
discrimination in corporate America?  Numerous scholars argue that discrimination is not the 
main reason for these gender gaps between men and women in leadership roles at the Fortune 
500.  Popularly presented theories in the social sciences suggest reasons, such as the opt-out 
revolution
56
 and maternal wall
57
 are keeping women from reaching the top spots. 
1.  The Opt-Out Revolution 
                                                        
54
 See supra Part I.B. 
55
 See supra Part I.A. 
56
  Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 26, 2003), 
www.nytimes.com/2003/10/26/magazine/26WOMEN.html?pagewanted=all 
57
  Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 78 (2003). 
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 One explanation of the wide gender gap in leadership could be due to personal 
preferences of women.  The “opt-out revolution” a phrase coined by New York Times reporter, 
Lisa Belkin, embodies the phenomenon of women’s voluntary choices seeking not to advance 
workplace, despite having equal qualifications to men.  In her piece, Belkin interviewed women 
with education from prestigious universities who had the abilities to advance in their respective 
fields, yet chose not to.
58
 Belkin asserts that females do not necessarily want to become leaders.
59
  
She posits that although women would like to be in these positions, they are not willing to “do 
what it takes to get there.”60 She argues that instead of traditional male-oriented forms of 
success, like money and power, once heralded as goals by women struggling to “get even” with 
men, now women are shifting their own ideas of success to include sanity, balance and work 
satisfaction.
61
  She notes that the shifting goals of approximately 50% of the employee base is 
beginning to create a response in employers as well, who are now providing more flexible 
schedules and increasing untraditional forms of working to retain their employees.
62
 
 Since this article was released there has been plenty of discussion within academic 
community of the merits of Belkin’s argument.  Critics of the opt-out-revolution find that the 
decision of women to voluntarily leave the workforce is more closely related to weaknesses in 
the labor market, rather than the opt-out theory.
63
  Other critics suggest, that the opt-out theory is 
a misdiagnosis of the problem, such that women are essentially pushed-out instead of opting-out 
because of the demands of the profession.
64
  Issues like workplace inflexibility, lack of family 
                                                        
58
 See Belkin, supra note 56. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 See Heather Boushey, CTR FOR ECONOMIC AND POL’Y RESEARCH, Are Women Opting Out? Debunking the Myth 
9-10, 13 (2005). 
64
 Id. at 420. 
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support and workplace bias against mothers seem to be drivers of push-out theory.
65
  Experts 
explain that workforce and workplace mismatch
66
 is the underlying rational of the push-out 
theory, as inflexible schedules and outdated notions of the ideal worker creates macroeconomic 
deskilling.
67
 
2.  Maternal Wall 
Although sometimes argued alongside with opt-out-theory, the mere fact that women 
physically give birth is widely accepted explanation for the gender gap in leadership positions in 
corporate America.
68
  Some scholars call this rational the “maternal wall”69 describing when 
women reach a motherhood stage, some form of discrimination prevents her from advancing at 
work and results in increasing wage gaps between men and women.
70
  This maternal wall 
develops in three points, when a woman gets pregnant, when she becomes a mother, or when she 
begins working on a part-time or flexible work arrangement.
71
  The maternal wall form of 
discrimination is premised on the idea that a woman’s responsibilities for her children are 
preventing her from being a reliable employee.
72
  Generally, strong stereotypes of incompetence 
                                                        
65
 Id. 
66
 See Williams, supra note 36, at 43. see also Boushey, supra note 63, at 13 
67
 See Williams, supra note 56, see also Boushey, supra note 62, at 13 
68
 See Priscilla Painton, The Maternal Wall, TIME (May 10, 1993), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978472,00.html; see also Nicole Porter, Re-Defining 
Superwoman: An Essay on Overcoming the Maternal Wall in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y, 
55 (2006).  
69
 See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who 
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003).  
70
 Id., See also CENSUS, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 
(2012). 
71
 See Williams, supra note 26, at 78.  
72
 See Claire-Therese D. Luceno, Maternal Wall Discrimination: Evidence Required for Litigation and Cost-
Effective Solutions for A Flexible Workplace, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 157, 159 (2006). 
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are associated with mothers,
73
 and therefore the maternal wall is an explanation for mothers’ 
inability to advance up the corporate ladder.   
Although the maternal wall is prevalent argument, there is reason to suggest that this 
concept may no longer present major problems for women’s struggle to advance up the ranks at 
Fortune 500 companies, as the law appears to have a remedy for this form of discrimination 
under the FMLA
74
, Title VII
75
 and Equal Pay Act.
76
  Recently, many mothers or caregivers are 
either filing administrative complaints or suing and courts are often finding in their favor.
77
  
Armed with successful precedent, mothers may hold a bargaining chip against employers in the 
future, as employers may become more conscious of maternal wall discrimination to avoid these 
types of situations.  Despite more favorable litigation results, the maternal wall form of 
discrimination is most likely not completely eviscerated from corporate America; however, it 
maybe somewhat easier to pinpoint maternal discrimination because of noticeable and evident 
issues arising with childcare or birth, which allows the law to develop further remedies as the 
need arises.  
B. Behind the Scenes Discrimination: Implicit Bias and Structural Problems in the Workplace 
 
 Both concepts of the opt-out theory and the maternal wall suggest that women will 
always face external difficulties when balancing work and family commitments.  However, other 
                                                        
73
 See Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate Gender 
Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 401, 429 (2003)). 
74
 FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (1993). 
75
 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1993).  
76
 EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, §29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (1963). 
77
 See Joan C. Williams, Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the 
Civil Rights of "Careers" in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 31, 32 (2006) (concludes that employers 
have significant incentives to avoid maternal wall or caregiver discrimination because of successful litigation under 
Title VII or Equal Pay Act); see also Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731-32 n.5 (2003). 
(stereotype that “women's family duties trump those of the workplace” is a “gender stereotype”); Plaetzer v. Borton 
Auto., Inc., No. Civ. 02-3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at 6 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (holding that “where an 
employer's objection to an employee's parental duties is actually a veiled assertion that mothers, because they are 
women, are insufficiently devoted to work, or that work and motherhood are incompatible, such treatment is gender 
based and is properly addressed under Title VII.”). 
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forms of discrimination that are inherent due to general social stereotypes may be even more 
harmful to women as a whole than more salient forms of discrimination.  While overt 
discrimination will keep women from advancing up the corporate ladder because of external 
pressures or decisions by employers, implicit discrimination
78
 or unconscious bias
79
 could keep 
women from wanting to advance altogether.  Social awareness of implicit bias can remove the 
thought of women seeing themselves achieving corner office status.  In other words, implicit 
discrimination nips women’s ambitions in the bud and prevents women from trying achieve top 
positions in the first place, keeping great proportion of women far from potential executive talent 
pools altogether.  Unlike opt-out theory, which Belkin proposes that women leave to obtain goals 
such as balance and sanity, structural discrimination
80
 or workplace bias
81
 may be one of the 
factors serving as an impetus for women to take the “mommy track”82 or leave to raise a family, 
as they anticipate their efforts may be more efficient, worthwhile or productive in areas other 
than the workplace due to their awareness of implicit bias in certain work environments. 
1. Scholars Explain the Phenomenon of Unconscious Bias 
 
 Social science suggests that implicit or unconscious bias in the workplace remains 
widespread, but this bias goes undetected as it lies within thoughts and is not visible on paper or 
more outspoken forms.
83
  Empirical research developed by Anthony Greenwald and Mahzarin 
                                                        
78
 Implicit Association Test, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 
2012). See generally, Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL'Y REV., 477 (2007). 
79
 See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458, 460 (2001), See also, Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating 
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 (2007). 
80
 See infra Part II. 
81
 Id. 
82
 Rachel Emma Silverman, Is the Mommy Track Still Taboo, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2011, 11:21pm), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2011/03/27/is-the-mommy-track-still-taboo/. 
83
  See e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach As Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 849, 854 (2007), see also Jessica L. Martens, Thinking Outside the Big Box: Applying A Structural 
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Bajaji suggests a substantial disassociation between explicit and internal attitudes through the 
implicit associations test (“IAT”).84  The implicit association test generally states that internal 
attitudes and biases turn into actual behavior in the workplace. 
85
  Another study by Dr. Martha 
Foshi, revealed a double standard existed with perceived competence of men and women, 
involving the same tasks.
86
  Scholars provide the term “structural discrimination,” which 
embodies organizational behavior related to implicit bias.
87
  Structural discrimination theorist 
suggests that this type of discrimination is not a problem of isolated work decisions, but causes a 
bias in the workplace environments on a day-to-day basis.
88
 Professor Tristin Green elaborates 
the findings of unconscious bias and the implicit association test:   
A correlation between scores on implicit attitude tests and behavior toward group 
members, suggest that these biases actually do translate into behavior....In one 
recent study, researchers responded to over 1300 help-wanted advertisements with 
sets of four fictitious resumes.  Each resume was randomly assigned an African 
American-sounding name (e.g., Jamal or Lakisha) or a white-sounding name (e.g., 
Greg or Emily), and each set of four resumes included two higher-qualified 
applicants and two lesser-qualified applicants.
 
The white-sounding names 
received fifty percent more callbacks than the African American-sounding names, 
and while the better resume assisted white-sounding names by thirty percent, the 
better resume only minimally assisted African American-sounding names.
89
 
 
These implicit or structural biases also applies to men and women, as employers may associate 
women with presupposed notions of how they are supposed to act, rather than how they actually 
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act in the workplace.
90
  For example, some of these biases include different internal associations 
for actions by men and women respectively.  Studies suggest that male social behavior would be 
regarded as mentoring, rainmaking or negotiating a business deal, whereas similar behavior in 
women is interpreted as frivolous, non-work related sociability such as gossip.
91
   Another 
example of an internal association was found when an employee took time to make a decision.  
The study showed an association that a man “really think things through” whereas the woman 
was thought to be too hesitant.
92
   
Adding to the framework of the structural discrimination argument, social science 
suggests that women have more work environment barriers to success when compared to men.  
A Mckinsey & Co. study revealed that women perceive advancing in organizations as arduous 
because of workplace environment reasons such as the lack of role models, exclusion from 
informal networks and not having sponsors in upper management to create opportunities.
93
 
2. Gender Biased Workplaces or Discrimination Not Captured by Title VII: Practical 
Examples & Case Law 
 
 Although implicit discrimination or structural discrimination may be present throughout 
corporate America, plaintiffs have a difficult time bringing a Title VII claim for these forms of 
discrimination.
94
  As we have seen in prior case law, successful Title VII with respect to 
disparate impact claims are often found when discrimination is obvious.
95
  Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
provides a clear example of an entire corporate culture overtly biased against women.  Although 
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Wal-Mart was successful in defending a class action certification claim in U.S. Supreme Court 
and the case was never argued substantively, Lisa Featherstone, in her book Selling Women 
Short, provides that evidence of sex-bias in its corporate culture was apparent throughout the 
discovery process.
96
  Featherstone’s book is wrought with examples of gender discrimination, 
with personal tales of women’s plight to reach management.  Featherstone interviewed many 
Wal-mart employees, which all had similar stories of pervasive gender discrimination.  One 
specific plaintiff, Christine Kwapnoski faced comments from mangers such as “doll-up” and 
“dust the cobwebs off” [her makeup] and was told she had to have certain requirements prior to 
promotions, which males were never subject to.
97
   Moreover, Wal-mart’s percentage of women 
in management was significantly behind their competitors.
98
  Although, Wal-mart posited that it 
had a significant amount of women in management when including their “department 
managers,” these positions were paid hourly, unlike the male dominated manager roles that were 
salaried positions.
99
   Featherstone argues that few companies would define an hourly worker as 
a “manager,” additionally these “managers” are significantly paid less than salaried managers.100 
The Wal-mart department managers do not have “managerial-like” responsibilities as they 
cannot terminate employees or give raises.
101
  Department managers make significantly less than 
other managers, for example, a woman working as an hourly department manager makes on 
average $21,709 a year, whereas an assistant manager, the lowest level of salaried management, 
makes on average $37,322.
102
  Essentially, Wal-Mart was justifying its numbers of male-female 
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ratio goals by relying on positions that were clearly not similar to traditional management 
positions. 
Apart from clear cases with substantial direct evidence of sex discrimination, structural 
bias is more difficult to locate within the Title VII context.  Some case law suggests that 
structural bias may be apparent; however, without proper legal framework for these types of 
claims, it is unlikely that litigators would advance any cases without direct evidence or very 
strong circumstantial evidence.  An example of potential structural bias claims could be found in 
cases such as, Brooks v. Ashtabula County Welfare Dept., where plaintiff’s Title VII claim was 
dismissed, as a director’s allegation of her “ill-temper” was sufficient to describe why plaintiff 
was not promoted, despite repeated recommendations by her direct supervisor. 
103
  The 
employment decision in Brooks was based on a director’s sole belief of Brook’s temperament.104  
The director did not promote Brooks because he believed her attitude was “abrasive and 
judgmental” “she had a propensity to make arbitrary moral judgments and she aggravated co-
workers and other professionals her job brought her contact into.
105
   He also believed she 
donned a “superior attitude” towards clerical workers.106  However, nothing of this attitude was 
noted in her personnel file, in fact, her file contained a favorable recommendation from her direct 
supervisor.  The evidence of her bad attitude was based on the sole director’s testimony, and the 
court held this to be sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence.  While the court may have 
found some evidence of non-discriminatory motives for the employment decision in this case, 
the facts presented could seriously indicate some forms implicit  or unconscious bias on behalf of 
the director in his unilateral subjective decision not to promote Brooks. 
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Another example of potential structural bias could be found in Reilly v. Califano, where 
plaintiff did not survive a Title VII claim, because of the employer’s belief that plaintiff was too 
shy and not assertive was sufficient to rebut a prima facie claim. 
107
  He believed that she did not 
“possess the sort of personality and demeanor necessary for the position.”108 Again, in this case, 
it is possible for the hiring manager to have implicit bias when making a decision, yet the court 
gave deference to the employer’s subjective justification of Reilly’s shy personality.    
Additional examples of these subjective biases with personality traits could bee seen in 
Kelner v. Green Refractories, where the supervisor believed “her attitude, loud and aggressive 
nature was sufficient to rebut a prima facie Title VII claim.
109
  In this case, the plaintiff was even 
more qualified than the competition, yet she did not obtain a promotion due her supervisor’s 
subjective belief of her “attitude.”110  Metzsh v. Avaya, Inc., is another example of potential 
subjective bias in employment decisions, as in this case, plaintiff’s bad attitude with respect to 
certain assignments was held sufficient to rebut a prima facie claim of discrimination.
111
  In cases 
such as Reily, Brooks, Kelner and Metzch where plaintiffs’ personalities and not qualifications 
are the deciding factors of litigation may be largely influenced by structural discrimination, yet 
given some these results, Title VII fails to capture some forms of unconscious or implicit 
discrimination. 
III.  Title VII and Structural Discrimination 
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Plaintiffs have various methods of pursuing violations under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964
112
 for gender discrimination in the workplace. A string of United States Supreme 
Court cases has developed over time to include various interpretations of sexual discrimination 
within Title VII.
113
  There are two basic legal theories that are helpful for women in gender 
discrimination claims in the workplace with respect to glass ceiling issues: disparate treatment 
and disparate impact.
114
   
Disparate treatment includes “pretext,” “mixed motive” and “hostile work environment” 
claims.
115
  To succeed in a “pretext” case courts generally require a three-step process, as 
provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.  The woman must first prove a prima facie case 
by showing that she is a member of a protected class, she must be qualified for the position, and 
was rejected by her employer.
116
  Then the burden shifts to the Defendant to offer a 
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.
117
  If the Defendant offers a sufficient reason, the 
burden shifts back to the employee to prove the Defendant’s reason is pretext for sex 
discrimination.
118
  Mixed-motive cases require impermissible criteria that were a substantial or 
motivating factor for an employment decision. 
119
   Hostile work environment claims are another 
subset of disparate treatment theory, which requires that women be exposed to workplace with 
                                                        
112
 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1993). 
113
 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998) for hostile work 
environment cases, See also Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. 
Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 113 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991) for disparate treatment claims; 
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S. Ct. 347, 54 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1977) for disparate impact claims. 
114
 See FAY J. CROSBY, MARGARET S. STOCKDALE & S. ANN ROPP, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE, 101 
(2008).  
115
 See generally Int'l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 390, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1882, 52 L. Ed. 2d 
396 (1977); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 116, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L. Ed. 2d 106 
(2002). 
116
 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). 
117
 Id. at 802. 
118
 Id. at 802. 
119
 See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 228. 
 20 
overt discrimination, intimidation, ridicule and insult, and that employer was aware, yet failed to 
prevent discriminatory conduct in the workplace.
120
   
Another major legal theory under Title VII includes “disparate impact” claims, which 
allow plaintiffs to challenge employment practices that appear to be neutral, but have a harmful 
impact on a protected group. 
121
 In order to establish a claim under this interpretation, a plaintiff 
needs to demonstrate that an employer’s facially neutral practice or plan operates in a 
discriminatory pattern.
122
  Once this is shown, and employer must rebut plaintiffs claim by 
justifying that its practice or standards have a manifest relation to employment.
123
  If the 
employer is able to prove this defense, the plaintiff can still argue that the practice is a pretext.
124
  
A.  Disparate Treatment: Burden on the Defendant 
 
The problem with glass ceiling cases and the disparate treatment arguments under Title 
VII is that generally, the higher one ascends within an organization, the more subjective 
employment decisions may become; therefore the risk of structural or implicit bias may become 
highly associated to employment decisions.
125
  One main disadvantage with the disparate 
treatment analysis under the current U.S. Supreme Court interpretation is that the burden of proof 
for employers is very easy to overcome with respect to rebutting a prima facie showing of 
discrimination.  The burden of production for defending disparate treatment cases is still under 
discussion and has been disputed prior to the Hopkins case.
126
  In Hopkins, the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to adopt a clear & convincing standard for the defendant’s response to a prima 
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facie case by only requiring a preponderance of the evidence standard.
127
  Subsequently, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“CRA”) altered the Hopkins standard and offered an easier 
“motivating-factor” method, which allows plaintiff to prevail, even though the discrimination is 
not the but for cause of the adverse decision.
128
 Although the burden is somewhat more favorable 
for plaintiffs, a preponderance of the evidence standard may still be insufficient in light of the 
unconscious bias that may be involved in decision-making processes.   
When unconscious bias is at play, its is very difficult to determine whether it has taken 
place.  An employer can arguably set forth any reason for its action, so long as it is rational and 
sounds convincing.  As hiring decisions in upper management may be very subjective,
129
 
employers are easily able to defend a prima facie claim by providing a legitimate reason, yet still 
retain bias at the same time.  For example, in Ezold v. Wolf Block, Schoor & Solis, an attorney 
(Ezold) was able to provide a prima facie case of discrimination, but because the employer 
provided a defense that the attorney lacked analytical ability (even though there was evidence 
that her intellectual growth was stymied by structural bias in her given assignments) the court 
held employers defense sufficient.  The court assumed that employer’s decision into her 
assignments were not caused by discrimination and gave strong deference to the employer with 
respect to its decision not to give Ezold more complex assignments.  One explanation of the 
employer’s decision could be related to implicit bias against her abilities as a female, yet this was 
not considered by the Court. 
130
  Other case law prior to the Civil Right Act of 1991 evidences 
the entry of structural discrimination.  In earlier cases, so long as employers created a rational 
business reason for the seemingly discriminatory acts, the court would not uphold a disparate 
                                                        
127
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treatment claim, even though implicit discrimination could be a motivating factor for an 
employment decision. 
131
   
B.  Arguing Disparate Impact 
 
Disparate impact
132
 theory is also not an effective method for a glass-ceiling claimant.  Initially a 
claimant could probably easily make a prima facie showing on a disparate impact claim, as this 
theory is based on facially neutral practices and do not require proof of motive or intent of 
discrimination by employers.
133
  Given the statistics of few women in management positions,
134
 
theoretically a female plaintiff would probably be able to obtain evidence showing some form of 
disparate impact of an employer’s hiring practices, if she can provide statistical evidence.135  
However, these statistics may be hard to compare, as employment decisions are made on an 
individualized basis.
136
 Moreover, disparate impact necessitates a showing that a “particular 
employment practice” has a disparate impact on a protected group, or if an employer’s selection 
process has a disparate impact and the components of that process cannot be separated by 
analysis.
137
  Thus, a glass-ceiling plaintiff would have to identify a specific practice that is 
impacting her group.
138
  This may, in application, prove very difficult if the employment practice 
or barrier is implicit or subjective internal decision made by hiring managers that is not based on 
a company-wide policy.  Unfortunately, there are also statutory exemptions that make disparate 
                                                        
131
 See, eg. Meyer v. Lehman, C-82-4913-WWS, 1983 WL 30290 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 1983) (holding that a 
possibility of motivation by unconscious or conscious gender-based preference is not enough to show the employers 
decision as pretext); see also, Judge v. Marsh, 649 F. Supp. 770, 781 (D.D.C. 1986) (where court held that 
subjective criteria may include discrimination, but having subjective hiring criteria is not unlawful per se). 
132
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West). 
133
 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338 (1977); see also Crosby Et. Al. supra, note 115, at 109 
134
 See infra, Part I.  
135
 Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 338. (The Supreme Court noted “a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII can 
be established or disproven solely on the basis of statistical evidence”). 
136
 Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1193 (1988). 
137
 Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 
967 (2005). 
138
 Id.  
 23 
impact claims unappetizing for a glass-ceiling claimant, such as the lack of jury trials, limited 
remedies, and exemptions for seniority or merit systems.
139
   
Additionally, under this theory employers can also easily defend disparate impact claims, 
as current black letter law states that employer’s burden to show the practice has a “manifest 
relation to the employment,”140 as opposed to the more stringent requirement of “bonefide 
occupational quality,”141 which only applies when a policy is facially discriminatory.142  A 
manifest relation to employment has generally been interpreted to mean that the actions are 
based on legitimate business reasons, but historically courts have had an ambiguous 
interpretation to this defense. 
143
   The Wards Cove opinion is a U.S. Supreme Court case that 
attempted to elaborate the interpretation of the employer’s defense. The majority adopted a 
business necessity standard stating that the challenged practice did not need to be essential or 
indispensible to employer’s interest but it must serve the employers legitimate employment 
goals. 
144
 The Wards Cove opinion also was somewhat ambiguous with respect to burden of 
production and persuasion for the employer. 
145
  The Civil Rights Act of 1991 helped clarify the 
ambiguity after Wards Cove, as the statute provides that an employer bears both burdens of 
production and persuasion when providing a defense for a prima facie disparate impact claim.
146
 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reiterates that a defending party must prove a business necessity 
after a showing of disparate impact; however, if the defending party can prove that the 
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employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, it does not need to show a business 
necessity defense.
147
  This would probably be a common pitfall the glass-ceiling plaintiff, who 
cannot identify a specific employment practices that results in a disparate impact.  Thus, 
rendering this theory problematic for the unconscious and subjective aspects of her claim.  
C.  Title VII: Disparate Treatment & Disparate Impact Claims 
 
Title VII disparate treatment claims are not sufficient to capture the structural and 
implicit discrimination that social science has determined is exists in the workplace.
148
  Prior to 
Hopkins, courts have conceded that subjective decision making could lead to influences of bias 
and discrimination that are unconscious and even conscious, but are difficult to trace during 
litigation and are not sufficient to counter an employer’s justifications.149 Although the court in 
Hopkins, found discrimination through a disparate treatment claim, the actions were so obvert, a 
situation like this would be difficult to find at this point in time.   
Some cases support that plaintiffs are failing to make prima facie case even though facts 
suggest that implicit bias is a motivating factor for an employment decision.   For example, in 
Infante v. Ambac, there was considerable evidence that a woman’s motherhood was taken into 
consideration during the interview process.  The employer asked questions like: “How does this 
fit into the mix of you now being a mother of two living in New Jersey, is this really what you 
want to do? How does that fit into the mix?....She was also asked “with [your] situation now, do 
[you] want to come back to Ambac, do [you] really want to come back, is this what [you] want? 
                                                        
147
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The employer proceeded to hire a male after the plaintiff’s interview, yet the court found that the 
plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination.
150
 
Moreover, scholars argue Title VII is no longer viable as a remedy for structural 
discrimination, as corporations or employers tend to create “sham” internal processes that do not 
really battle structural bias, these practices are merely reactions to potential litigation and do not 
really solve the foundational problems. 
151
 Thus, neither disparate treatment, nor disparate impact 
claims can capture implicit bias and they do not “examine or directly encourage revision of the 
intra-organizational culture and decision processes that entrench bias, stereotyping, and unequal 
access.”152  This line of reasoning suggests that current Title VII remedies are no longer 
sufficient to address the underlying issues within structural bias and are calling for other 
alternatives, such as Sturm’s arguments for a new regulatory approach, or Tristin Green who 
suggests a revamping disparate treatment claims under a structural approach for 
discrimination.
153
  
IV.  Solution: Proposals  
Implicit bias has proven to be a difficult task to litigate, as without physical or conscious 
evidence of discrimination, it would be nearly impossible for a plaintiff to bring forth sufficient 
evidence of unconscious discrimination.
154
  Apart from completely rewriting Title VII or 
creating a regulatory system to capture implicit discrimination some smaller changes can be done 
which would assist in protecting women from unconscious bias in the workplace.  
A.  An Alternate Interpretation: Disparate Treatment 
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Although disparate impact theory provides less burden in that it does not require evidence 
of discriminatory intent, modifying the disparate impact theory to include glass ceiling type suits 
could bring seriously threat to the competing interest of employers rights to its professional 
judgments courts have always protected.
155
  One potential alteration to Title VII would be to 
raise the employers’ burden of persuasion when providing a response to a prima facie disparate 
treatment claim to a clear and convincing standard.  Although a preponderance of the evidence 
standard is generally used in Title VII cases,
156
 the burden of persuasion should be lifted for 
disparate treatment type of cases because discrimination can be so subtle and employers may 
more easily evade structural or implicit bias issues with a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.   Although lifting the standard will not completely eviscerate unconscious bias because 
implicit bias is difficult to pinpoint, having an employer prove a business necessity defense 
under a higher standard may help weed out unconscious discrimination problems by requiring 
more concrete evidence of legitimate business reasons from an employer.  The higher standard 
may also prompt employers to be more careful about the potential of employment discrimination 
and ensure that supervisors are aware of the dangers of unconscious bias in the workplace.  
Although some may claim that this would entice frivolous lawsuits, placing a higher burden on 
the defendant would not detract from the fact that plaintiffs would have to still prove a prima 
facie case and still provide a safeguard from meritless suits. 
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B.  Biased Work Environment Claim 
 
Another more radical alternative would be to provide an added framework argument for a 
Title VII, which would provide for relief for those who challenge discrimination due to a “biased 
work environment” claim under a disparate treatment theory.  The claim would act similar to a 
hostile work environment
157
 claim, in that it would be actionable based on an objective and 
subjective standard.  While a hostile work environment deals with sexual harassment and abusive 
work environment issues, the biased work environment claim would be another cause of action 
attempting to control a gender biased work environments.  The proposed claim would have very 
limited parameters and a plaintiff would have to casually connect the biased environment to 
some type of negative employment decision in order to prevent frivolous litigation.  Essentially, 
the goal for this proposed biased work environment claim would attempt to encourage employers 
to consider implicit bias with respect to the work environment it creates and would hold 
employers liable for furthering or creating a biased work environments.   
A biased work environment cause of action would include aspects of structural 
discrimination such as informal policies that may inhibit employees from advancing,
158
 such as 
maintaining “old boy”159 networks or disparate availability of mentorship opportunities.160  
Male-oriented or dominated networking activities still reign in corporate America.
161
  These 
environments may prevent women from socializing and creating valuable networks, which are 
useful in advancing to the top. 
162
 Some examples of these types of claims could include 
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employers being aware of or promoting informal networking events for male-dominated or 
oriented activities.  Although the event may not have excluded women facially, the nature of the 
activity precluded women from attending due to sex-based stereotypes, which may have made 
them feel uncomfortable in attending (such as golf outings, fantasy football, nightclubs).  Other 
examples would include showing stigmatization for working from home, even though employers 
maintain a telecommuting policy or if an employer failed to assist women employees in finding 
suitable women mentors.   
While litigating this type of claim may have some practical limits, as many of these 
scenarios are difficult to prove in the context of litigation, the proposed claim would be more 
useful as a warning to corporations.  The fact that a plaintiff would be enabled to bring this type 
of claim could cause some corporations to reconsider their work environments and create 
systems to solve the problem rather than seeking prevent litigation.  Critics of this type of claim 
would suggest that government is intruding upon the employer’s autonomy and their rights in 
management of the workplace.  This would be a policy question, that legislature would have to 
balance the importance of an avenue structural discrimination claims against employers’ 
autonomy.  
Part V: Conclusion 
Part of the difficulties of Title VII disparate impact claims and unconscious 
discrimination could be related to courts strong adherence to the doctrine employment at-will.
163
  
The reasoning underlying this connection is that if employers are able to terminate employees at 
will, their promotion decisions should also be allowed great deference.  Although a violation of 
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the Civil Rights Act works like an exception to the at-will doctrine,
164
 courts may still adhere to 
policy reasons for upholding an at-will mentality, especially when discrimination may not be 
obvious.  The Supreme Court in Hopkins and Civil Rights Act of 1991 decisions not to lift 
employers burden of persuasion of a legitimate business interest to clear and convincing 
standard
165
 may be partially due to the notion of common law at-will contracts that reiterate the 
long-held beliefs that employers are entitled to deference when they make employment 
decisions.   
Some scholars argue that strengthening Title VII claims does nothing more than create 
inefficiencies and does not address the underlying problem.
166
  Many argue that employers will 
respond to threat of Title VII liability by over-investing in measures that will not likely reduce 
implicit bias.
167
 However, if we were to create a claim under Title VII that specifically forces 
employers to consider unconscious bias or structural discrimination when creating a work 
environment, this would help avoid the issues of “sham” internal processes. 168 The proposed 
workplace bias claim could have a result in encouraging employers to rethink how they structure 
their workplaces and create a more gender diverse work environments.   Although corporate 
America is well on its way to addressing some of these issues, it seems that more needs to be 
done given the current statistics of women leaders.  A new Title VII claim could help nudge 
companies who talk-the-talk, but do not walk-the-walk when it comes to providing equal 
opportunities for its women leaders. 
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